F-35A vs Gripen E: Why Canada Needs a Mixed Air Fleet

Canada is finalizing a long-term commitment to its next-generation fighter fleet. While the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II has dominated the headlines and procurement process, many analysts and defence strategists continue to argue for a more balanced approach that reflects Canada’s non-aggressive, defence-oriented military posture. Enter the JAS 39 Gripen E, Sweden’s cost-effective and resilient multirole fighter.

In this article, we compare the F-35A and Gripen E across key domains, and propose a strategic mixed-fleet solution tailored to Canada’s unique geography, alliances, and policy values.

F-35A vs Gripen E: A Comparative Analysis

FeatureF-35A Lightning IIJAS 39 Gripen E
OriginUnited StatesSweden
RoleStealth multirole strike & ISRAgile, cost-effective air defense
Stealth5th-gen stealth with internal weapons baysLow-observable 4.5-gen fighter; external weapons only
SensorsFusion: AESA radar, DAS, EOTS, HMDAESA radar, IRST, electronic warfare suite
Speed & AgilityMach 1.6, less agileMach 2.0, supercruise, high agility
Operating Cost~$35,000/hr~$8,000 – $10,000/hr
MaintenanceComplex, centralized logisticsModular, road-capable, easy maintenance
InteroperabilityDeep NATO/NORAD integrationFlexible, sovereign-capable system
Best Suited ForHigh-end coalition warfareDomestic sovereignty & intercept missions

The F-35A excels in stealth, sensor fusion, and networked warfare. It’s optimized for first-strike and multi-domain operations in complex allied theatres. The Gripen E, by contrast, is designed for national airspace protection, low-cost deployment, and high survivability through speed and agility.

For most countries, the choice between them is binary. But for Canada, a mixed fleet provides the best of both worlds.

Canada’s Defence Posture: Defence, Not Offence

Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (source), emphasizes:

  • Sovereignty protection, particularly in the Arctic
  • Fulfillment of NORAD and NATO responsibilities
  • Commitment to peacekeeping and allied security, not aggression or projection

This makes a single-type, stealth-heavy force both expensive and strategically limiting. The F-35A’s sophistication comes with high costs and logistical burdens. The Gripen’s versatility and affordability make it ideal for Canada’s domestic priorities, especially Arctic response and cost-effective patrols.

The Ideal Fleet Mix: 48 F-35A + 36 Gripen E

A proposed balanced force of 84 aircraft could look like this:

  • 48 F-35A Lightning II – Two combat squadrons for NATO/NORAD + First-strike SEAD missions
  • 36 JAS 39 Gripen E – Two intercept/sovereignty squadrons for Cold Lake & Bagotville + Pilot training

This mix satisfies Canada’s allied obligations while keeping operational costs under control and increasing resilience and redundancy.

Mission-by-Mission Alignment

Mission TypeAircraft Best Suited
NATO expeditionary combatF-35A
Arctic sovereignty patrolsGripen E
NORAD interceptsGripen E (routine), F-35A (high threat)
Peacekeeping air policingGripen E
First-strike SEAD missionsF-35A
Pilot trainingGripen E (cost-effective)

Additional Benefits of a Mixed Fleet

  • Economic efficiency: Gripen costs 3–4x less to operate, allowing more flying hours and Arctic readiness.
  • Strategic autonomy: Saab offers greater technology transfer and offset potential, unlike the F-35 program.
  • Operational resilience: Gripens can operate from rural or improvised runways in the North.
  • Supplier diversification: Reduces geopolitical and logistical risk from relying on a single supplier (U.S.).

Potential Challenges & Mitigations

ConcernMitigation
Dual logistics systemsSegmented basing and dedicated maintenance crews
InteroperabilityGripen is NATO-compatible and can integrate via standard datalinks
Training duplicationGripen used for advanced pilot training and tactical development

Final Word

A dual-fighter strategy is neither nostalgic nor redundant, it is forward-thinking. By balancing cutting-edge stealth with efficient sovereignty defence, Canada can build an air force that is:

  • Strategically aligned with its defensive posture
  • Economically sustainable over decades
  • Technologically capable of high-end conflict
  • Operationally flexible across vast geography

This isn’t just a compromise, it’s a model of how Canada can lead by example in blending technology, sovereignty, and peacekeeping into a cohesive air defence strategy.

Sources

Tags: #CanadianDefence #F35 #Gripen #NORAD #NATO #ArcticDefence #MilitaryPolicy #Peacekeeping #AirPower

The Hidden Cost of the F-35: Sovereignty on a Leash

This is the second in a series of posts discussing U.S. military strategic overreach. 

By any reasonable metric, the F-35 fighter is an impressive piece of military engineering. It boasts stealth capabilities, sensor fusion, and interoperable systems that promise to keep Canada in the front ranks of allied air power. Yet, beneath the glossy marketing and Lockheed Martin hype lies a truth so quietly alarming that it should give every Canadian policymaker pause: Canada does not fully control its own F-35s, not even the spare parts sitting on its own soil.

A recent Ottawa Citizen article revealed a startling fact: all spare parts for Canada’s F-35 fleet remain the legal property of the United States government until they are installed into an aircraft. Even parts that Canada has paid for, warehoused, and stored at Canadian bases are subject to U.S. control. The implications for sovereignty are both profound and disturbing.

This is not a bug in the system, it is a feature. The F-35 program operates under a U.S.-controlled global logistics system, originally known as ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) and now being transitioned to ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network). This system governs not only parts distribution, but also mission data, performance diagnostics, and maintenance schedules. In short, Canada cannot operate or maintain its F-35s without ongoing U.S. authorization.

What does this mean in practice? It means that in any scenario, be it a geopolitical crisis, a domestic emergency, or even a diplomatic spat, Canada’s operational readiness is beholden to U.S. goodwill. If Ottawa wanted to deploy its F-35s in a mission that Washington disapproved of, access to critical spare parts could be curtailed or denied. Even worse, Canada wouldn’t have a legal leg to stand on. That’s not interoperability, that’s dependency.

The Trudeau government, and now the Department of National Defence under Minister Bill Blair, has justified the F-35 purchase on the grounds of performance and alliance coherence, but this latest revelation should force a hard rethink. The fighter itself may fly, but Canadian sovereignty is grounded every time we accept conditions that limit our own use of military equipment.

This is not just a theoretical concern. Recent U.S. behaviour, whether through protectionist trade moves, political instability, or withholding of military assistance to allies, underscores the risk of over-reliance on a single partner, even one as historically close as the United States.

To be clear, this is not an anti-American stance. Cooperation with the U.S. remains vital to Canada’s defense posture. But there is a stark difference between cooperation and concession of control. The F-35 deal, as it stands, crosses that line.

Ottawa should demand contractual clarity and sovereign guarantees, including ownership and full control of spare parts. If that’s not possible within the F-35 framework, then we must have the courage to explore alternatives, however inconvenient or politically difficult they may be.

Because no matter how advanced the aircraft, a fighter jet that can’t be flown without permission isn’t a tool of national defence, it’s a symbol of diminished independence.

Sources
Ottawa Citizen F-35 fighter jet spare parts remain U.S. property until installed in Canadian aircraft https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/f-35-fighter-jet-spare-parts-u-s-canada