Canada’s Coast Guard Joins the Defence Team: Integration or Quiet Militarization?

The Canadian government’s decision to fold the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) into the Department of National Defence marks a decisive moment in the evolution of the country’s maritime policy. Through an Order in Council enacted in early September, and framed publicly as a “historic integration,” the Coast Guard now formally joins the Defence Team while remaining, at least in name, a civilian special-operating agency. Alongside this bureaucratic shift, Bill C-2 – the Strong Borders Act – seeks to expand the CCG’s authority into new territory: maritime surveillance, security operations, and intelligence sharing. The language is cautious, but the direction unmistakable. Canada is re-casting its civilian fleet as a security instrument.

The advantages of this integration are clear enough. For decades, Canada’s maritime operations have suffered from duplication, fragmented command structures, and chronic under-coordination between the military, the Coast Guard, and various federal agencies. Unifying them under the defence umbrella promises better coordination, faster response times, and improved data flow across security domains. The move also signals a more assertive posture in the Arctic, where the melting of sea ice has opened new routes, resource prospects, and geopolitical interest. By linking the Coast Guard’s icebreakers, patrol ships, and scientific vessels to Defence planning, Ottawa aims to strengthen sovereignty and deterrence at a time when northern waters are becoming increasingly contested.

There is also an unmistakable element of fiscal and strategic pragmatism. Integrating existing civilian assets into the national security structure allows Canada to stretch its limited defence budget further without the political or financial burden of creating a new armed maritime service. The Coast Guard already provides an extensive logistical network, technical expertise, and near-permanent presence on three coasts and the Great Lakes. With modest investment, these capabilities can be adapted to enhance maritime domain awareness and support allied security objectives, including NATO’s northern surveillance initiatives. In an era of hybrid threats, where cyber intrusions, illegal fishing, and state-sponsored maritime interference blur traditional lines between defence and law enforcement, this integration appears both efficient and strategically inevitable.

Yet the risks are equally consequential. At stake is the Coast Guard’s long-standing civilian identity and the public trust that comes with it. The CCG has always been seen as a service of rescue, safety, and stewardship: unarmed, apolitical, and oriented toward the public good. As the agency takes on intelligence and security functions, that image could erode. The distinction between civilian protection and military surveillance becomes harder to maintain once the two operate under the same institutional roof. Without robust oversight, the Coast Guard’s evolution could lead to mission creep, where a service designed for environmental response and humanitarian aid finds itself entangled in enforcement or intelligence operations that carry political and ethical complexity.

Legal and constitutional questions also loom. Expanding the Coast Guard’s powers will require new frameworks for information sharing, privacy protection, and operational accountability. The proposed amendments under Bill C-2 would permit the collection and dissemination of security data to domestic and international partners. Such activities raise concerns about transparency, data governance, and proportionality, especially when conducted by a civilian agency with limited independent oversight. Moreover, the shift implies deeper operational alignment with the military and allied security agencies, a change that demands clear boundaries to prevent duplication, confusion, or jurisdictional conflict in crisis situations.

Behind the policy lies a broader strategic influence. The United States provides an obvious model. Its Coast Guard functions as a hybrid institution—part law enforcement, part military, part humanitarian service—operating seamlessly across domestic and defence spheres. Canada’s move appears to emulate that structure, reflecting an understanding that maritime security in North America is increasingly integrated. While there is no public evidence of direct U.S. pressure, the gravitational pull of American strategic expectations is unmistakable. Washington has long encouraged its allies to shoulder more responsibility for continental and Arctic security. As the United States expands its presence through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization and Arctic exercises, Ottawa’s reorganization of its maritime agencies can be read as a complementary alignment rather than a coincidence.

This convergence serves both nations. For the United States, a better-resourced, defence-aligned Canadian Coast Guard strengthens the North American maritime perimeter. For Canada, closer alignment provides diplomatic cover against accusations of underinvestment in defence and enhances interoperability with U.S. command structures. Yet this alignment carries political trade-offs. The closer the Coast Guard moves toward military functions, the more Canada risks blurring its distinctive approach to maritime governance, a tradition rooted in civilian expertise, scientific stewardship, and non-militarized presence.

The political optics of the transition will matter as much as its operational outcomes. The government has emphasized collaboration, modernization, and sovereignty, avoiding any suggestion of militarization. The opposition has been cautious, wary of the costs and implications but unwilling to oppose measures that appear to bolster national security. What remains missing is a transparent national conversation about what kind of maritime posture Canada truly wants: one that prioritizes civilian safety and environmental protection, or one that integrates those aims within a broader security agenda driven by alliance politics.

In strategic terms, the integration may be both inevitable and necessary. The maritime domain is no longer a quiet space of rescue operations and scientific missions; it is a theatre of competition, surveillance, and geopolitical risk. Canada cannot afford to operate its civilian and military fleets as separate silos. Still, the success of this reform will depend on balance, between security and service, between alliance and autonomy, and between efficiency and democratic oversight.

If handled wisely, this reorganization could give Canada a modern, resilient, and integrated maritime posture worthy of its geography and global role. If managed poorly, it risks politicizing a trusted civilian institution and blurring the lines that define responsible democratic defence. The Coast Guard’s new place within the Defence Team is not just an administrative adjustment; it is a statement about the kind of nation Canada intends to be on the world’s waters.

Sources:
Government of Canada, “National Defence welcomes the Canadian Coast Guard to the Defence Team,” September 2025;
CityNews Toronto, “Federal government begins to transfer Coast Guard to National Defence,” September 2, 2025;
Canadian Military Family Magazine, “Canadian Coast Guard joins Defence Team,” September 2025;
Open Government Portal, “Question Period Brief: Strong Borders Act (Bill C-2),” 2025.

Lines and Shadows: Policing the Border Together

For two centuries, the world’s longest undefended border has stood as both a symbol and a contradiction. Between Canada and the United States lies a line that is deeply cooperative yet fiercely guarded, a frontier where trust and sovereignty meet in uneasy balance. That balance is being tested again with new calls from American legislators to expand the reach of U.S. law enforcement onto Canadian soil.

Republican Congressman Nicholas Langworthy, joined by Rep. Elise Stefanik, introduced the Integrated Cross-Border Law Enforcement Operations Expansion Act in September 2025. The bill directs the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to negotiate agreements allowing more American agents to operate in Canada under joint or integrated frameworks. It explicitly contemplates the stationing of U.S. officers in Canadian territory and the extension of U.S. legal protections to them while engaged in such operations. The proposal builds upon the existing Shiprider program, a bilateral maritime policing arrangement first authorized in 2012 that allows mixed crews of RCMP and U.S. Coast Guard officers to pursue suspects seamlessly across the Great Lakes and coastal waters (Government of Canada, 2012).

At its best, cooperation of this kind can prevent traffickers, smugglers, and violent extremists from exploiting jurisdictional seams. Integrated units already share intelligence, coordinate arrests, and conduct joint investigations on both sides of the line. In a world of fentanyl trafficking, encrypted communications, and drone-borne smuggling, no single agency can claim full visibility. The argument for “shared enforcement” rests on practical necessity.

But there is a deeper question about sovereignty and democratic accountability. Policing power is among the most sensitive expressions of a nation’s authority. Allowing foreign officers to act, even in partnership, raises profound legal and moral concerns. Who answers to whom when something goes wrong? What laws govern a use-of-force incident in Quebec if the officer is wearing an American badge? The existing Shiprider framework attempts to answer this by designating the officer in charge to be of the host nation and requiring all participants to be cross-designated and subject to local law. Any expansion would need to preserve, not erode, that principle.

So far, Ottawa has not publicly commented on the Langworthy-Stefanik proposal. The silence may reflect caution: few Canadian governments wish to appear either obstructionist toward U.S. security interests or complacent about sovereignty. Yet the issue deserves open discussion. Cross-border policing already shapes daily life along the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the Pacific coast. The next evolution could redefine how nations share force, intelligence, and responsibility.

What is being tested is not merely a policy, but a philosophy, whether two democracies can defend their people without blurring the line that defines them. The border has long been a place where we practice cooperation without surrender. The challenge now is to ensure it remains so as law enforcement grows more integrated, technologically driven, and politically charged.

The shadow of that line may lengthen or lighten, depending on how both nations choose to police it together.

Sources:
• “Stefanik, Langworthy Introduce Bill to Expand Cross-Border Law Enforcement Operations,” Stefanik.house.gov, Sept 19 2025.
• Integrated Cross-Border Law Enforcement Operations Act (S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 361), Government of Canada.
• Government of Canada backgrounder, “Shiprider: Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement,” Public Safety Canada, 2013

The Democrats’ Dilemma: Mamdani, Progressive Policies, and the Party’s Future

Update – With Eric Adams now out of the 2025 New York City mayoral race, new polls show Zohran Mamdani maintaining a strong lead. Across Marist, Emerson, and Quinnipiac data, Mamdani holds steady in the mid-40s while Andrew Cuomo edges up to around 30 percent, suggesting Adams’ exit has done little to change the race’s overall direction.

Mainstream Democrats continue to treat left-of-center politics with caution, even as voter dissatisfaction, economic pressures, and social inequality push many Americans toward structural change. The tension has been evident in national interviews, where figures such as Vice President Kamala Harris offer measured support for progressive candidates like Zohran Mamdani, the insurgent Democratic nominee for mayor of New York City. That lukewarm endorsement reflects deeper structural and ideological dynamics: a party historically rooted in pragmatism and centrism struggles to reconcile its identity with the rising energy of its progressive wing.

Several factors explain this cautious stance. U.S. electoral politics favors moderation. The geography of swing states, the power of suburban and independent voters, and the design of the electoral college create incentives for Democrats to avoid appearing “radical.” Progressive policies, ranging from universal healthcare to rent freezes and free transit, often poll well in the abstract but face skepticism once voters consider costs, trade-offs, and feasibility. Party strategists worry that pursuing bold policies could alienate moderate or older voters, threatening general election viability.

Institutional pressures reinforce this cautious posture. The Democratic Party relies on a coalition that includes centrist politicians, business-aligned donors, and interest groups, many of whom prefer incremental reforms over systemic change. Media framing amplifies this risk, as ambitious proposals are often labeled “socialist” or “extreme,” creating a political environment in which party leaders hesitate to embrace bold policies fully. Even when polling shows popular support for measures such as stricter rent control or climate investment, strategic reticence prevails because of narrative risk and fear of electoral backlash.

The 2025 New York City mayoral race brings these dynamics into sharp relief. Zohran Mamdani, a democratic socialist from Queens, has built a platform around rent freezes, affordable housing, free bus service, and major public investment. For many progressives, his rise demonstrates that bold left-of-center policies can mobilize voters in one of the nation’s largest and most visible cities. For establishment Democrats, however, his candidacy raises questions about the party’s future direction and internal cohesion.

Polling indicates Mamdani enters the fall campaign as the clear front-runner. A Quinnipiac University survey of likely voters showed him at 45 percent, compared to Andrew Cuomo at 23 percent, Curtis Sliwa at 15 percent, and Eric Adams at 12 percent. (Adams has since dropped out of the race.) An AARP New York/Gotham Polling survey reported similar results, with Mamdani at 41.8 percent. Marist College and the New York Times/Siena College polls echo this pattern, consistently placing him near or above 45 percent. Two-way scenarios narrow the margin, Marist found Mamdani at 49 percent versus Cuomo’s 39 percent, but the general trend underscores his advantage. Mamdani’s support is strongest among younger voters, renters, and those most concerned about housing affordability and cost-of-living pressures, while Cuomo performs better with older voters and those prioritizing experience or safety.

A Mamdani victory could produce significant ramifications for the Democratic Party. Symbolically, it would validate progressive policy as electorally viable and energize activists nationwide. It could encourage ambitious policy proposals in housing, transit, and climate, pressuring other Democrats to adopt a more leftward orientation to remain relevant. The victory would also likely sharpen internal tensions, forcing a confrontation between centrists who favor incremental change and progressives advocating systemic reform.

National polling underscores the opportunity for such a shift. Surveys indicate widespread support for policies associated with progressive Democrats. Measures like a $15 minimum wage, universal pre-K, expanded childcare, and climate investment enjoy majority backing, even among some independents and moderate Republicans. Younger voters, in particular, consistently favor progressive positions, with many willing to endorse structural change across a range of economic and social issues. Yet a gap remains between policy support and ideological self-identification. Many Americans back specific policies without labeling themselves progressive or wanting the party to move sharply left, reflecting ambivalence about broader systemic change. Framing, trade-offs, and cost perceptions significantly influence these attitudes.

The interplay of local victories and national trends will shape the Democratic Party’s evolution. Mamdani’s success could embolden progressive candidates elsewhere and accelerate the adoption of left-of-center policy agendas. At the same time, his tenure would face significant constraints, including state law, budget limits, opposition from landlords and businesses, and the need to deliver tangible results. Failures or perceived missteps could reinforce centrist arguments that progressive policies are impractical, deepening intra-party divides.

Thus, the Democratic Party stands at a crossroads. Mainstream leaders remain cautious due to electoral risk, institutional pressure, and fear of alienating moderates. Nationally, public support for progressive policies is significant, particularly among younger voters and urban constituencies, but the party must balance ambition with pragmatism. The 2025 New York mayoral race offers a high-profile test of whether progressive governance can gain legitimacy and influence broader party strategy. A Mamdani victory could shift the party leftward and validate systemic reform, while setbacks or backlash could reinforce centrist control, illustrating the fragility and contested nature of the party’s ideological trajectory.

The Democratic Party’s future may hinge on its ability to reconcile grassroots enthusiasm for progressive change with the practical demands of governance and national electoral strategy. The outcome in New York may not only determine local policy, but also signal the direction of American liberal politics in the coming years.

Why We Must Rethink Policing: History, Failure, and a Path Forward

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has long been emblematic of the modern police force, yet recent investigations, including the BBC Panorama undercover report and the Baroness Casey Review, have exposed deep-seated issues within the institution. These revelations highlight systemic racism, sexism, and a culture that often undermines public trust. This essay argues that the foundational purpose of policing—to protect property and maintain order—has evolved in a manner that no longer aligns with contemporary societal needs. Drawing on recent findings, it contends that the current model of policing is inadequate and proposes a reimagined approach to public safety.

Introduction

The inception of modern policing can be traced back to Sir Robert Peel’s establishment of the Metropolitan Police Service in 1829. Designed to protect property and maintain order, the force’s primary function was to serve the interests of the propertied classes. Over time, the role of police expanded to encompass broader public safety responsibilities. However, recent investigative reports have cast a spotlight on the MPS’s internal culture, revealing systemic issues that question the efficacy and fairness of the current policing model.

Historical Context: The Origins of Modern Policing

Sir Robert Peel’s creation of the MPS was predicated on the need to protect property and maintain social order. This foundational purpose embedded certain priorities within the institution, emphasizing control and enforcement over community engagement and support. As policing evolved, these priorities became ingrained in the institution’s culture, influencing recruitment, training, and operational strategies.

Recent Investigations and Findings

BBC Panorama Undercover Report

In a groundbreaking undercover investigation, BBC Panorama exposed disturbing behaviors within a central London custody suite. Officers were recorded making racist, misogynistic, and Islamophobic remarks, dismissing rape allegations, and boasting about harming detainees. This footage not only shocked the public but also underscored the existence of a toxic culture within the MPS that tolerates discriminatory behavior.

Baroness Casey Review

Commissioned in the wake of the murder of Sarah Everard by a serving officer, the Baroness Casey Review aimed to assess the standards of behavior and internal culture of the MPS. The 2023 report concluded that the MPS is institutionally racist, sexist, and homophobic. It identified systemic failures, including inadequate leadership, a lack of accountability, and a culture that tolerates discrimination. The review’s findings align with the concerns raised by the Panorama investigation, painting a grim picture of the institution’s internal dynamics.

The Inadequacy of the Current Policing Model

The revelations from these investigations suggest that the current model of policing is ill-equipped to serve the diverse and evolving needs of society. The emphasis on enforcement and control, rooted in the historical purpose of protecting property, has led to practices that disproportionately affect marginalized communities. For instance, Black Londoners are more likely to experience police powers such as stop and search, and there is a significant disproportionality in arrest rates.

Furthermore, the culture within the MPS, as highlighted by both the Panorama report and the Casey Review, often undermines public trust. Discriminatory behaviors are not only prevalent but are also tolerated or ignored, leading to a breakdown in the relationship between the police and the communities they serve.

The BBC Panorama Investigation: A Real-Time Illustration

The BBC Panorama undercover investigation inside a central Met custody unit documented officers making racist, misogynistic and Islamophobic remarks, dismissing rape allegations and boasting about harming detainees. The Met responded by suspending officers, disbanding the implicated custody team and opening fast-track disciplinary procedures. The Independent Office for Police Conduct launched further inquiries. The footage shocked national leaders and civil society and rekindled debate about whether incremental internal reform is adequate. The Panorama material must be read alongside the Casey review and prior IOPC reports to see the pattern of failure.

Rethinking Public Safety: Principles for a New Design

  • Separation of Enforcement and Care: Crisis responses, particularly those involving mental health, homelessness, and substance abuse, should be led by trained professionals such as social workers and healthcare providers.
  • Community-Based Policing: Policing should be localized, with officers embedded within communities to build trust and understanding, emphasizing prevention and engagement over enforcement.
  • Accountability and Transparency: Independent oversight bodies should monitor police conduct and ensure accountability. Transparency in operations is crucial to rebuild public trust.
  • Cultural Transformation: Address ingrained institutional discrimination with comprehensive training, clear policies, and a commitment to diversity and inclusion.

Conclusion

The recent investigations into the Metropolitan Police Service have illuminated deep-rooted issues that question the institution’s ability to serve the public effectively and equitably. The historical purpose of policing, focused on protecting property and maintaining order, has evolved in a manner that no longer aligns with the needs of contemporary society. By reimagining public safety through a model that emphasizes care, community engagement, accountability, and cultural transformation, we can build a system that truly serves all members of society. The Panorama footage, the Casey review findings and related inquiries make the imperative clear. It is time to take the harder path and redesign how we secure public safety for everyone.

References

  1. BBC Panorama. (2023). Undercover: Inside the Met.
  2. Casey, L. (2023). Baroness Casey Review: Independent Review into the Standards of Behaviour and Internal Culture of the Metropolitan Police Service.
  3. Hackney Council. (2023). The Met Police as an institution is broken.
  4. Southwark Council. (2023). Response to Baroness Casey’s Final Report.
  5. Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC). (2024). London Policing Board Equality Impact Assessment.
  6. Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). (2024). Race Discrimination Report.

Four Reforms to Make the Feds Smaller, Smarter, and More Accountable

With a Fall budget on its way, I think it’s time to provide a little input to the government’s thinking. I plan on developing these ideas further over the next few days before Canada’s Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne delivers the 2025 Federal Budget in the House of Commons on November 4, 2025.

Canadians are right to expect more from their government. Every year, the federal payroll grows, administrative costs rise, and services often fail to keep pace with expectations. Prime Minister Mark Carney has a rare opportunity: to modernize Ottawa, reduce waste, and deliver real results for citizens. Four reforms can achieve this vision: ending internal cost recovery, unifying pay and bargaining, adopting outcomes-based management with planned workforce reduction, and automating taxation for wage-only employees.

End internal cost recovery
Departments and agencies currently bill each other for routine services. Justice Canada invoices other departments for legal advice, Shared Services Canada bills for IT support, and administrative units cross-charge for HR and translation. This internal economy consumes thousands of staff hours for paperwork that adds no value to Canadians. Ending cost recovery would simplify budgeting, reduce bureaucracy, and free public servants to focus on meaningful work. Money would be directly appropriated for services, and departments judged by the outcomes they deliver, not the invoices they process.

Adopt a single pay scale and central bargaining agent
The current patchwork of pay scales and multiple unions is costly, confusing, and inequitable. Starting April 1, 2027, all new hires, and any promotions thereafter, should be placed on a single pay scale, with a central bargaining agent representing these employees. Over time, as legacy staff retire, the workforce will converge onto a transparent, uniform system. This builds on decades of prior harmonization work, such as the Universal Classification Standard (UCS) project, and dramatically reduces administrative complexity while ensuring fair and consistent compensation.

Focus on outcomes and shrink the workforce responsibly
Too often, success in Ottawa is measured by hours logged or forms completed. Shifting to outcomes-based management holds departments and employees accountable for results citizens can see. With clearer accountability, the government can responsibly reduce its workforce by 5% annually over five years through attrition and selective hiring. This ensures a smaller, more focused public service while maintaining service quality and providing a review point to adjust if needed.

Automate taxation for wage-only employees
Millions of Canadians file annual tax returns despite receiving income solely through employment, which is already subject to withholding for income tax, CPP, and EI. Like many European systems, Canada could automate reconciliation for these taxpayers, eliminating the need to file a return. This reform would dramatically reduce compliance burdens, shrink the Canada Revenue Agency, and allow the agency to focus on enforcement and complex cases rather than processing simple returns.

A coherent vision for reform
These four reforms share a common principle: simplify, focus, and deliver. They reduce waste, cut bureaucracy, and ensure public servants are evaluated on results rather than paperwork. They free staff to concentrate on tasks that provide tangible value to Canadians while saving hundreds of millions annually in administrative costs.

Prime Minister Carney has the chance to lead Canada into a new era of efficient, accountable government. Ending internal cost recovery, unifying pay, managing for outcomes, and automating taxation are practical, proven, and achievable reforms. Canadians deserve a federal government that works smarter, spends taxpayer dollars wisely, and prioritizes service above bureaucracy.

Preclearance, NEXUS, and Nonsense: The Ambassador Who Cried ‘Play Nice’

Diplomacy, as the textbooks remind us, is supposed to be the fine art of saying nothing offensive in as many words as possible while drinking bad coffee in conference rooms. But nobody seems to have given that manual to Pete Hoekstra, the newly minted U.S. Ambassador to Canada, who has decided to trade in understatement for a megaphone. In the span of a few short months, Hoekstra has managed to scold Canadians for not being sufficiently pro-American, accuse us of harboring “anti-American” slogans, and downplay Canada’s concerns about border overreach. If he’s aiming for “charm offensive,” he has nailed the second half of the phrase.

This is, of course, not the first time Canada and the U.S. have had words. We’ve bickered over softwood lumber, dairy tariffs, steel quotas, pipelines, and, once upon a time, acid rain. But usually ambassadors play the role of polite go-between, smoothing over disputes while the real political firestorms rage between ministers and presidents. Hoekstra seems to have missed the memo: his preferred strategy is less smooth diplomacy, more bull in a China shop – minus the bull’s natural grace.

His latest theme? Canadians just aren’t playing nice. We apparently spend too much time with “elbows up,” as if the entire country were auditioning for beer league hockey. He’s miffed that Canada has dared to issue travel advisories about U.S. border searches, insisting those reports are “isolated events.” Never mind that Canadian travelers actually experienced them. It’s a bit like telling someone who just got splashed by a passing truck that rain isn’t real.

Nowhere is this attitude more obvious than in the discussions around U.S. preclearance, the system where American border officers operate inside Canadian airports, inspecting passengers before they even board a plane to the United States. For travelers, preclearance is handy: you arrive stateside as a domestic passenger, skip long immigration lines, and make your connections. For the U.S., it’s even better: it lets them enforce their rules on foreign soil, keeping anyone they don’t like from ever boarding. For Canada, it’s…..complicated. Preclearance represents cooperation, yes, but also a certain loss of sovereignty. Not surprisingly, Ottawa sometimes drags its heels on expansion.

To Hoekstra, though, Canada’s reluctance to roll out the red carpet for more American officers in our airports amounts to ingratitude. The U.S. gives us this wonderful gift, he implies, and we respond with suspicion. It’s the diplomatic equivalent of scolding a dinner guest for not raving loudly enough about the casserole. The irony is rich: when Canada recently announced its first landpreclearance operation in the U.S., with Canadian officers screening travelers at a New York border crossing, nobody in Ottawa suggested that Americans were being unfriendly. Apparently only Canadians can be accused of bad manners.

And then there’s NEXUS, the trusted traveler program that makes cross-border trips bearable for frequent fliers. Here, too, Canada and the U.S. cooperate closely, with Canadians now able to use Global Entry kiosks thanks to their NEXUS membership. But you wouldn’t know it from the ambassador’s rhetoric. He talks as if the U.S. is single-handedly shouldering the burden of efficiency while Canada stubbornly blocks progress. The reality is that both sides benefit and both sides foot the bill. Preclearance doesn’t spring fully formed from Washington; Canadian airports build the facilities, Canadian taxpayers share the costs, and Canadian sovereignty bends to make it possible.

So why the sharp elbows from Hoekstra? Partly it’s style, he has never been known as a shrinking violet. But partly it reflects a broader U.S. strategy of leaning harder on Canada. The two countries are already sparring at the World Trade Organization over tariffs that Ottawa calls “unjustified.” Washington wants more Canadian concessions on energy, environment, and defense spending. Ambassadors don’t freelance in these circumstances; they set the tone their bosses in the White House prefer. If that tone is loud, impatient, and dismissive of Canadian sensitivities, then Hoekstra is performing to spec.

Still, it’s worth noting how Canadians are responding. While most don’t object to preclearance itself, after all, we enjoy shorter lines at airports, there is resistance to being lectured about it. Canadians pride themselves on being cooperative partners, not subordinate provinces. When the ambassador claims Canada isn’t “playing nice,” many hear it as “you’re not agreeing quickly enough with U.S. demands.” The fact that Canada has invested in NEXUS expansions, shared intelligence, and even put its own officers on U.S. soil underlines the absurdity of the accusation.

In the end, Hoekstra’s style may generate headlines, but it risks eroding goodwill. Diplomacy works best when it feels like a partnership of equals, not a schoolteacher scolding a roomful of students. Canadians are famously polite, but we’re also famously stubborn when pushed. If the ambassador thinks a little tough talk will get Canada to open every airport door to U.S. preclearance, he may be in for a long wait.

Until then, travelers will keep swiping their NEXUS cards, lining up at preclearance facilities, and quietly rolling their eyes at the spectacle. After all, Canadians know that living next to the United States is a bit like living next to an elephant. When it shifts, you feel it. When it trumpets, you really feel it. And when the ambassador starts lecturing you about your manners, sometimes the most diplomatic response is the Canadian classic: a polite smile, a quiet mutter, and an elbow gently nudged back into his ribs.

When Crown Corporations Forget Their Purpose

Two of Canada’s most visible Crown corporations, Canada Post and VIA Rail, seem to have lost their way. Both were created to knit together a vast and sparsely populated country, ensuring that every Canadian, no matter how remote, had access to essential services. Yet today, both have turned their gaze inward toward big-city markets, downgrading or abandoning the rural, northern, and remote communities they were meant to serve.

The problem is not simply poor management. It is a deeper contradiction in how we think about these federal institutions. Are they public services, funded and guaranteed by the government for the benefit of all? Or are they commercial enterprises expected to operate like businesses, focusing on profitability and efficiency?

Canada Post was once the backbone of national communication. Its universal service obligation was understood as a cornerstone of Canadian citizenship: every town and hamlet deserved a post office, and every address would receive mail. But with letter volumes collapsing and courier giants competing for parcels, Canada Post has shifted its focus to the most profitable markets. Rural post offices are shuttered or reduced to part-time counters in retail stores, and delivery standards in remote regions are steadily eroded.

VIA Rail’s story follows the same pattern. Founded in the late 1970s to preserve passenger trains when private railways abandoned them, it was meant to provide Canadians with a reliable and accessible alternative to highways and airlines. Instead, successive governments have treated VIA as a subsidy-dependent business rather than a national service. The Québec–Windsor corridor receives ever more investment, while iconic transcontinental and regional services limp along on political life support. Communities once promised rail access now watch the trains roll past them, or disappear entirely.

This retreat from universal service runs against the spirit of equality that Canadians expect from their public institutions. The Charter of Rights may not explicitly guarantee access to mail or transportation, but the principle of equal citizenship surely demands more than a market-driven approach that privileges Toronto and Montréal while ignoring Thompson or Whitehorse.

What’s going wrong is simple: Crown corporations are being managed as if they were private companies, not public trusts. Efficiency metrics and financial self-sufficiency dominate decision-making. National obligations are left vague, unenforced, or quietly abandoned. Governments praise the rhetoric of service while starving these corporations of the dedicated funding that would allow them to fulfill it.

Canada is not a compact, densely settled country where commercial logic alone can sustain public goods. It is a nation stitched together across vast geography by institutions that recognize service as a right, not a privilege. If we want Canada Post and VIA Rail to serve all Canadians, we need to stop pretending they can behave like for-profit businesses and still fulfill their mandates.

That choice is ultimately political. Parliament must decide: either redefine these corporations as genuine public services with modern mandates and stable funding, or admit that rural and northern Canadians will always be left behind.

Until then, our Crown corporations will continue to forget their purpose, and with it, a piece of the Canadian promise.

Pete Hegseth’s Quantico Meeting: Dissent, Risk, and Resistance

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s decision to convene hundreds of senior military leaders at Marine Corps Base Quantico on September 30, 2025, has generated a remarkable amount of debate inside the Pentagon and across Washington. The meeting, which included the presence of President Trump and was framed as a morale-building rally, combined populist language with concrete policy shifts. It emphasized a return to what Hegseth called a “warrior ethos,” a reduction in the number of four-star commands, and a strategic redirection of defense resources toward homeland security over foreign commitments. While the spectacle of so many generals and admirals gathered in one place caught the public eye, the real story lies in the competing interpretations of what the meeting signified, and how valid the dissent from senior officers truly is.

At its core, the criticism of Hegseth falls into two broad categories. The first category consists of genuine policy and operational concerns. These objections focus on the risks that arise when a new strategy is imposed quickly and without the depth of consultation that military leaders expect. The United States has spent decades building a global presence through NATO, alliances in Asia, and security partnerships in Africa. If those priorities are suddenly reduced or redirected, adversaries may perceive weakness and act opportunistically. The suggestion that homeland defense should take precedence over overseas commitments alarms many planners, who argue that credible deterrence abroad is what ultimately keeps the homeland safe. Just as concerning is the physical risk created by concentrating so many senior leaders in one place. In the age of terrorism and cyber conflict, the idea of creating a single point of failure for military leadership is regarded by many as reckless. These criticisms may reflect institutional conservatism, but they also have clear strategic validity.

The second category of dissent is tied more closely to career prospects, budgets, and organizational prestige. Cuts to four-star commands, for example, reduce opportunities for senior officers to rise to the top. The reallocation of funds away from long-standing overseas headquarters threatens programs that have sustained careers, institutional identities, and congressional ties for decades. Even the cultural objection to Hegseth’s “warrior ethos” rhetoric can be read partly as discomfort with his outsider tone and partisan style. Military leaders accustomed to more technocratic language may find his populist approach off-putting, regardless of whether it improves or harms operational effectiveness. These complaints do not necessarily mean that the officers raising them are wrong, but they reveal how intertwined personal advancement and policy debate can be within the senior ranks.

Where the picture becomes most complicated is in the middle ground, where career concerns and operational risks overlap. Morale and cohesion, for example, are partly about career security but also affect how well units function under stress. Similarly, questions of alliance credibility have both strategic weight and institutional implications, since overseas commands are often the most prestigious assignments available. Resistance to Hegseth’s agenda is therefore not neatly divisible into “valid” and “self-interested” camps. Instead, each issue carries elements of both, and part of the task for civilian leaders is to distinguish which objections point to genuine threats to U.S. security and which reflect the understandable resistance of an entrenched bureaucracy to change.

Taken together, the dissent underscores a deeper tension in American civil-military relations. Civilian control requires that appointed leaders set strategy, even when the uniformed services disagree. Yet history also shows that ignoring the professional judgment of senior officers can lead to miscalculations with high costs. Hegseth’s critics argue that he lacks the operational grounding to make decisions of such magnitude, pointing to his background in politics and media rather than command experience. Supporters counter that his outsider perspective allows him to break through bureaucratic inertia and push reforms that insiders would never accept. Both views contain truth, and the outcome will likely hinge on whether Hegseth can translate his rhetoric into workable policy while maintaining the confidence of enough of the officer corps to keep the system running smoothly.

If we weigh the dissent carefully, perhaps half of it points to genuinely significant strategic risks. The dangers of over-focusing on homeland defense, of weakening alliances, and of creating leadership vulnerabilities are all concerns that would trouble any responsible planner. Roughly another third of the pushback reflects predictable resistance from senior officers whose career trajectories and command prerogatives are being cut short. The remainder, perhaps the most interesting portion, lies in the overlap between institutional interest and national strategy. Issues like morale, cohesion, and alliance credibility matter both for the personal interests of officers and for the effectiveness of the force as a whole.

To clarify the distinction, here is a risk-versus-resistance map that separates concerns into those that are primarily policy/operational risks (valid dissent) and those that are largely career/budget resistance (self-interest). Some issues occupy a middle ground, blending both.

ConcernDescriptionImportance
Strategic de-prioritization of China, Europe, AfricaReducing focus on alliances may embolden adversariesHigh
Homeland defense emphasisOver-focus on domestic security may leave overseas contingencies underpreparedMedium-High
Concentration of leaders in one locationCreates a single point of failure for leadership continuityHigh
Rapid strategy changesAbrupt shifts risk operational gapsMedium
Expertise gapPolitical appointee-led decisions may lack operational groundingMedium
Reduction of four-star positionsCuts limit career progression and prestigeMedium-High
Budget reallocationsFunding shifts threaten existing programsMedium
Cultural pushbackResistance to “warrior ethos” rhetoricLow-Medium
Media restrictionsPress control raises concern about accountabilityMedium
Morale and cohesionImpacts operational effectiveness but also career dynamicsMedium-High
Alliance credibilityAffects U.S. global standing, but objections partly tied to overseas commandsHigh

The Quantico meeting, then, should not be read simply as a populist stunt or a bureaucratic clash. It is a moment when the future of U.S. defense policy is being tested in real time. Hegseth has chosen to frame his reforms in the language of ethos and toughness, signaling a shift toward domestic focus and leaner leadership structures. The officer corps is responding with a blend of genuine strategic caution and predictable institutional resistance. Observers must separate the noise of career frustration from the signal of authentic national security risk. Whether Hegseth can achieve that balance will shape not only his tenure as defense secretary but also the long-term posture of the United States in an increasingly unstable world.

From Dystopian Fiction to Political Reality: Britain’s Digital ID Proposal

As a teenager in the late 1970s, I watched a BBC drama that left a mark on me for life. The series was called 1990. It imagined a Britain in economic decline where civil liberties had been sacrificed to bureaucracy. Citizens carried Union cards; identity documents that decided whether they could work, travel, or even buy food. Lose the card and you became a “non-person.” Edward Woodward played the defiant journalist Jim Kyle, trying to expose the regime, while Barbara Kellerman embodied the cold efficiency of the state machine.

Back then it felt like dystopian fantasy, a warning not a forecast. Yet today, watching the UK government push forward with a mandatory digital ID scheme, I feel as if the fiction of my youth is edging into fact.

The plan sounds simple enough: a free digital credential stored on smartphones, initially required to prove the right to work. But let’s be honest, once the infrastructure exists, expansion is inevitable. Why stop at work checks? Why not use it for renting property, opening bank accounts, accessing healthcare, or even voting? Every new use will be presented as common sense. Before long, showing your digital ID could become as routine, and as coercive, as carrying the Union card in 1990.

Privacy is the first casualty. This credential will include biometric data and residency status, and it will be verified through state-certified providers. In theory it’s secure. In practice, Britain’s record on data protection is chequered, from NHS leaks to Home Office blunders. Biometric data isn’t like a password, you can’t change your face if it’s compromised. A single breach could haunt people for life.

Exclusion is the next. Ministers claim alternatives will exist for those without smartphones, but experience tells us such alternatives are clunky and marginal. Millions in Britain don’t have passports, reliable internet, or the latest phone. Elderly people, the poor, disabled citizens, these groups risk being pushed further to the margins. In 1990, the state declared dissidents “non-people.” In 2025, exclusion could come from something as mundane as a failed app update.

The democratic deficit is just as troubling. Voters already rejected ID cards once, when Labour’s 2006 scheme collapsed under public resistance. For today’s government to revive the idea, in digital clothing, without wide public debate or strong parliamentary scrutiny, is a profound act of political amnesia. We were told only a few years ago there would be no national ID. Yet here it comes, rebranded and repackaged as “modernisation.”

And then there’s the problem of function creep. In 1990, the Union card didn’t begin as an instrument of oppression; it became one because officials found it too useful to resist. The same danger lurks today. A card designed for immigration control could end up regulating everyday life. It could be tied to financial services, travel, or even access to political spaces. Convenience is the Trojan horse of coercion.

The government argues this will tackle illegal working and make life easier for businesses. Perhaps it will. But at what cost? We will have built the very infrastructure that past generations fought to reject: a system where your ability to live, work and move depends on a state-issued credential. The show I watched as a teenager was meant to remind us what happens when people forget to guard their freedoms.

This isn’t just a technical fix. It’s a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. Once the power to define your identity sits in a centralised digital credential, you no longer own it, the government does. That should chill anyone who values freedom in Britain.

We need to pause, debate, and if necessary, reject this plan before the future we feared on screen becomes the present we inhabit.

VIA Rail Misses the Train on Serving Canadians

VIA Rail recently trumpeted a new “pilot project” meant to shave half an hour off the Montréal–Toronto run. The idea was to run nonstop trains between the two big cities, bypassing Cornwall, Brockville, Kingston, and Belleville. The announcement was pitched as a bold experiment in “efficiency,” a nod to the 70 percent of surveyed passengers who supposedly wanted quicker travel between downtown cores.

But almost immediately, the wheels came off. Citing “operational constraints” with their partner CN, VIA Rail suspended the project before it even left the station. On paper, this looks like a technical hiccup, another example of Canada’s fragile rail system bending to the priorities of freight traffic. But in reality, the plan itself was the problem. It was never about serving Canadians, it was about copying European or Japanese rail gloss without any of the context, backbone, or infrastructure investment those systems require.

For decades, communities along the corridor have depended on trains as lifelines. Students in Kingston, retirees in Belleville, families in Cornwall – these aren’t “optional” stops. They’re the heart of what passenger rail is supposed to do: connect Canadians, not just shuttle executives between two large metro centres. The whole point of a public Crown corporation like VIA Rail is to balance speed with accessibility, ensuring that smaller communities aren’t stranded in the name of shaving 30 minutes off a trip for a select few.

Even politicians, often slow to notice transit tweaks, raised red flags. Brockville’s mayor called the nonstop plan “concerning” and Conservative MP Michel Barrett branded it “unacceptable.” They weren’t wrong. Stripping out regional stops would have meant sidelining thousands of riders, effectively telling entire towns they were expendable in the rush to serve big-city commuters.

The irony is that the project was marketed as modernization. But modernization, in a Canadian context, should mean strengthening regional ties, upgrading track infrastructure, and finally breaking free of freight’s stranglehold on passenger rail, not copying a TGV fantasy while underfunding the very communities that give the corridor its economic and social weight.

Instead, VIA Rail now looks like it tried to leap forward without noticing the tracks were missing. Worse, its apology to passengers rings hollow. The real apology is owed to the communities it dismissed as speed bumps, to the Canadians who still believe public transportation is about more than corporate surveys and flashy PR lines.

In the end, the scrapped nonstop pilot is a lesson: if VIA Rail wants to serve Canadians, it needs to remember who those Canadians are. They’re not just the 70 percent who want to get to Bay Street faster. They’re also the people in eastern Ontario whose taxes help keep VIA afloat, and who deserve not to be treated as collateral damage in a misguided chase for efficiency.

Sometimes slowing down isn’t failure, it’s service. VIA Rail might want to remember that before the next “pilot project” takes off.