Canada’s decision to signal its intention to join Europe’s ReArm initiative marks a significant pivot in its strategic and procurement priorities, with implications that extend well beyond the defense sector. This pan-European effort, catalyzed in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shifting tenor of transatlantic politics, aims to coordinate defense procurement, scale industrial capacity, and strengthen European security autonomy. For Canada, a non-European NATO member with strong ties to both the U.S. and Europe, alignment with ReArm offers both substantial opportunity and strategic complexity.

At the forefront of the appeal is diversification. Canada has long relied on the United States for upwards of 75% of its military procurement. While the U.S. – Canada defense relationship, particularly through NORAD, remains indispensable, the risks of a politically volatile or inward-focused Washington have grown. Europe’s response, particularly Germany’s ramped-up defense commitments, and the €800 billion EU proposal to stimulate continental arms production, presents an alternative axis of reliability. Canada’s participation could signal to both NATO allies and global partners that it seeks greater resilience in its defense posture.

One of the most concrete areas of cooperation could lie in the domain of submarine procurement. The CBC reports that Canada is exploring options for the German-Norwegian Type 212CD submarine, a next-generation conventional submarine being co-developed by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and Kongsberg. This class boasts extended underwater endurance through air-independent propulsion and quiet operation ideal for Arctic patrols, long a capability gap in Canadian naval strategy. The possibility of Canada becoming a formal partner in the 212CD project would not only address its aging Victoria-class fleet but also create industrial synergies through potential domestic assembly and technology transfer agreements.

Beyond submarines, ReArm opens the door to collaborative fighter jet production. Canada’s inclusion in discussions around final assembly of Swedish Saab Gripen fighters suggests that Ottawa is seeking industrial offset opportunities beyond its existing Lockheed Martin F-35 commitments. These talks, while preliminary, reflect a desire to reassert domestic defense manufacturing after years of outsourcing.

Still, the risks are considerable. Aligning procurement strategies with European standards could create friction in interoperability with American systems, particularly relevant given NORAD modernization and Canada’s Arctic commitments. There is also the question of cost. Canada’s new defense policy promises to increase military spending to 1.76% of GDP by 2030, a notable jump, but still short of NATO’s 2% target. Adding ReArm investments could strain the federal budget, and force trade-offs in domestic priorities.

Geopolitically, joining a European initiative risks being interpreted in Washington as a soft decoupling. While this may be overstated, managing the optics with U.S. defense officials will require careful diplomacy. At the same time, any major procurement projects pursued under ReArm would need to be justified as both value-for-money, and strategically essential in a Canadian context.

ReArm represents a chance for Canada to assert greater agency in its defense strategy, while leveraging European innovation and industrial momentum, but this is no risk-free proposition. Ottawa will need to walk a careful line: embracing new partnerships without compromising old ones, and ensuring that each procurement project is grounded in long-term strategic logic, not simply in search of novelty.