This is the fourth in a series of posts discussing U.S. military strategic overreach. 

In recent years, the United States has been quietly consolidating a new form of power, not through bases or bullets, but through satellites and bandwidth. The global promotion of Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet system, by US embassies, and the parallel development of Starshield, a defense-focused communications platform, signals a strategic shift; the internet’s future may be American, orbital, and increasingly militarized. Far from a neutral technology, this network could serve as a vehicle for U.S. influence over not just internet access, but the very flow of global information.

Starlink’s stated goal is noble: provide high-speed internet to remote and underserved regions. In practice, however, the system is becoming a critical instrument of U.S. foreign policy. From Ukraine, where it has kept communications running amidst Russian attacks, to developing nations offered discounted or subsidized service via embassy connections, Starlink has been embraced not simply as an infrastructure solution, but as a tool of soft, and sometimes hard, power. This adoption often comes with implicit, if not explicit, alignment with U.S. strategic interests.

At the same time, Starshield, SpaceX’s parallel venture focused on secure, military-grade communications for the Pentagon, offers a glimpse into the future of digitally enabled warfare. With encrypted satellite communications, surveillance integration, and potential cyber-capabilities, Starshield will do for the battlefield what Starlink is doing for the civilian world; create reliance on U.S.-controlled infrastructure. And that reliance translates into leverage.

The implications are profound. As more countries become dependent on American-owned satellite internet systems, the U.S. gains not only the ability to monitor traffic but, more subtly, to control access and shape narratives. The technical architecture of these satellite constellations gives the provider, and by extension, the U.S. government, potential visibility into vast amounts of global data traffic. While public assurances are given about user privacy and neutrality, there are few binding international legal frameworks governing satellite data sovereignty or traffic prioritization.

Moreover, the capacity to shut down, throttle, or privilege certain kinds of data flows could offer new tools of coercion. Imagine a regional conflict where a state dependent on Starlink finds its communications subtly slowed or interrupted unless it aligns with U.S. policy. Or a regime facing domestic protest suddenly discovers that encrypted messaging apps are unusable while government-friendly media loads perfectly. These aren’t science fiction scenarios, they are plausible in a world where one nation owns the sky’s infrastructure.

To be clear, other countries are attempting to catch up. China’s satellite internet megaconstellation, Europe’s IRIS² project, and various regional efforts reflect a growing recognition that information access is the new frontier of sovereignty; but the U.S. currently leads, and its fusion of commercial innovation with military application through companies like SpaceX blurs the line between public and private power in ways few international institutions are prepared to regulate.

The result is a form of orbital hegemony, an American-controlled internet superstructure with global reach and few checks. The world must now grapple with a fundamental question: in surrendering communications infrastructure to the stars, have we handed the keys to global discourse to a single country?

Sources
• U.S. Department of Defense (2023). “DOD and SpaceX Collaborate on Starshield.”
• U.S. State Department (2024). Embassy outreach documents promoting Starlink in developing nations.
• Reuters (2023). “SpaceX’s Starlink critical to Ukraine war effort.”
• European Commission (2023). “Secure Connectivity Initiative: IRIS² Explained.”