There is a peculiar habit in Ottawa that reveals itself most clearly in defence procurement. It is the habit of mistaking alignment for dependence, cooperation for deference, and interoperability for inevitability. The proposed Canadian Forces space command and control project, now quietly priced somewhere between two hundred and four hundred million dollars, is a textbook example. What should be a sober discussion about Canadian sovereignty in the most strategic domain of the twenty-first century has instead become another case study in how deeply the senior civilian and uniformed leadership of the Department of National Defence has been captured by American assumptions, priorities, and frameworks.

The issue is not that Canada works closely with the United States in space. That is both unavoidable and desirable. The issue is that DND increasingly appears incapable of imagining a serious military capability that does not begin with the question, “How does the U.S. do this?” rather than, “What does Canada actually need?” When briefing notes openly frame U.S. assistance as a foundational requirement rather than an optional enhancement, the problem is no longer technical. It is cultural. Strategic thinking has been outsourced long before any contract is signed.
This is institutional capture, not conspiracy. It happens when careers are built inside allied command structures, when promotion rewards smooth interoperability rather than independent judgment, and when senior civilians absorb the same assumptions as the generals they are meant to challenge. Over time, the centre of gravity shifts. Canadian officers and officials begin to see American systems as the default, American timelines as the clock, and American doctrine as neutral truth rather than national preference. At that point, sovereignty is not surrendered dramatically. It simply fades into the background.
The space project exposes this drift with unusual clarity. Space command and control is not a niche capability. It sits at the intersection of intelligence, surveillance, targeting, Arctic defence, and escalation control. A system that cannot function independently in a crisis, even for a limited period, is not a sovereign capability. It is a terminal plugged into someone else’s infrastructure. Yet DND’s language suggests comfort with exactly that outcome, as though Canada’s role is to be a well-behaved node in an American-led network rather than a state with its own strategic thresholds and political constraints.
This is where the Carney government must act decisively, and quickly. Defence reform cannot be limited to budgets and white papers. The problem is not primarily money. It is leadership. Both the senior civilian ranks and the uniformed command structure at DND require a reset in incentives, expectations, and worldview. Canada needs defence leaders who are capable of working with the United States without being intellectually subordinate to it, who understand that alliance management is not the same thing as strategic abdication.
Strategic changes at the top of DND are therefore not punitive. They are corrective. The Carney government should be looking for leaders with demonstrated experience outside permanent U.S. frameworks, leaders who have worked in multilateral, civilian-led, or genuinely independent contexts. It should be asking hard questions about how often Canadian alternatives are even presented internally before U.S. options are adopted by default. And it should be willing to rotate out senior figures who have become too comfortable treating American preferences as Canadian interests.
None of this requires anti-Americanism. It requires maturity. The United States will continue to pursue its own interests in space, just as Canada must pursue ours. True allies respect that distinction. What they do not respect, and should not be encouraged to expect, is quiet compliance dressed up as partnership.
Space is not just another procurement file. If Canada cannot think clearly about sovereignty there, it will not think clearly about it anywhere. The danger is not that Canada will anger Washington. The danger is that Canada will stop mattering to itself. That is a failure no ally can fix for us, and no amount of interoperability will excuse.






